Taxes, Bribes, and Bids

This 6th edition of Facty Friday considers research about taxes, bribes, and bids

Taxes

Technology and Local State Capacity: Evidence from Ghana

Main Finding: Revenue collectors using a new technology delivered 27 percent more bills and collected 103 percent more tax revenues than control collectors. Collectors using the new technology learned faster about which households in their assigned areas were willing and able to make payments.

Programming Implication: There is a strong association between technology use and property tax billing, collection, and enforcement. Collectors using the new technology learned faster about which households in their assigned areas were willing and able to make payments. 

Bribes

The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency

Main Finding: Using a long term study, this study investigates and quantifies the scope, type and magnitude of corruption in a public agency. The paper illuminates the role of systems of corruption, showing how a manager's participation creates costs and profits beyond those possible with individual corruption. They also find corruption kills; corruption is associated with traffic accidents and traffic congestion. 

Programming Implication: Understanding the system of corruption, including the role of managers, has implications for the distortions of corruption beyond individual state officials. 

Bids

A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California

Main Finding: They use a quantitative method to identify causal relationships – Regression Discontinuity – to screen for collusion in public procurement data from five countries. They find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. They find statistically significant results in Indonesia where the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least ~5% for all E-procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions. 

Programming Implication: Using this quantitative method could be useful to those involved in transparency, accountability and anti-corruption programming.

Do you have a study we should share for a future Facty Friday? Send an email to drg.el@usaid.gov!